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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff/Appellee, * 
* 
vs. * 
JOHN MICHAEL TETMYER, * 
Defendant/Appellant. * 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant, John Michael Tetmyer, relies on his opening brief and refers this 
Court to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, issues, standards of review, cases and facts. 
Defendant/Appellant responds to the State's answer to his opening brief as follows. 
STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT 
Trooper Eldredge lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of Mr. 
Tetmyer. The factors set forth by the trooper are not articulable facts nor are the inferences 
drawn from those facts, rational. In looking at the factors, innocent explanations must be taken 
into account. Finally, the open container argument should be rejected as hindsight reconstruction 
which also does not add anything to a reasonable suspicion analysis. 
ARGUMENT 
THE FACTORS SET FORTH BY THE TROOPER DO NOT RISE TO 
THE LEVEL OF REASONABLE SUSPICION. 
Appellee takes the position that the stop of Mr. Tetmyer was justified based on the 
trooper's observations, namely, the obviously intoxicated passenger, Mr. Tetmyer's gait, the fact 
that both Mr. Tetmyer and the passenger made a beeline for the bathroom and Mr. Tetmyer's 
Case No.: 960702-CA 
Priority No.: 2 
failure to remove his sunglasses while he was in the convenience store (Appellee's Brief at p. 5). 
Appellee also asserts that Appellant's consideration of innocent behavior with respect to both 
parties making a beeline for the bathroom and Mr. Tetmyer's failure to remove his sunglasses is 
directly contrary to Utah precedent and the totality of the circumstances test (Appellee's Brief 
at p. 5). 
It is not Appellant's position that if an innocent explanation exists, such an explanation 
will defeat a finding of reasonable suspicion. It is well established that reasonable suspicion may 
be based on seemingly innocent conduct: All that is required is that there be articulable facts and 
rational inferences drawn from those facts that the individual has been, is or is about to engage in 
criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 65 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). Here, all that is set forth to justify the stop was Trooper 
Eldredge's observation of unrelated factors and subjective inferences drawn from those factors. 
An officer's hunch has been consistently and unequivocally held insufficient to justify an 
investigatory investigation. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ("inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
"hunch' is insufficient.") 
The validity of an investigatory detention is a fact specific question. To hold otherwise, 
would mean that all that is required to justify a detention is a lengthy list of factors regardless of 
the merit of any one individual factor. In State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 661 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996), this Court analyzed each factor individually before considering the factors collectively: 
Possession of a twelve-pack of beer in an 
automobile is a legal activity, apropos of nothing. 
Possession of a partially full twelve-pack of beer in 
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an automobile is a legal activity which, by itself, 
does not suggest the presence of open containers in 
the vehicle, even though it may suggest on some 
prior occasion beers were consumed or moved to an 
ice chest. The discernable odor of beer on the 
driver's breath adds nothing because the beer 
Patefield admitted he consumed could just as easily 
have been drunk outside the vehicle, with the can 
discarded in a trash barrel. Considering the totality 
of the circumstances, we conclude that Eldredge's 
determination that Patefield's van contained open 
containers has no rational basis. 
Accordingly, innocent explanations must be taken into account when determining whether 
the factors, collectively, rise to the level of reasonable suspicion. 
The State's reliance on Provo City Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) is 
misplaced (Appellee's Brief at p. 12). There, the Court made it clear that in determining whether 
reasonable suspicion exists, innocent explanations will not defeat a finding if the same factors are 
"strongly indicative of criminal activity." Here, the factors are not strongly indicative of criminal 
activity. Rather, they "describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers" and, 
therefore, cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Reidv. Georgia, 488 U.S. 438, 100 
S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890, 894 (1981). See also State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 436 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) 
The State also relies on the "common sense" argument set forth in State v. Smith, 833 
P.2d 371 (Utah Ct. App. 1992): "In developing reasonable articulable suspicion, law enforcement 
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officers are entitled to reach 'common sense conclusions about human behavior5."1 (Appellee's 
Brief at p. 10). Appellant concedes that officers are entitled to rely on their common sense. 
This, however, does not transform a subjective inference into one that is objective. Here, 
Appellant contends that the passenger's intoxication and both individual's "quick trips to the 
bathroom," are facts that "'by reason of simple biology' support the reasonable suspicion of an 
alcohol related offense." (Appellee's Brief at p. 10). 
Here, Mr. Tetmyer gassed up his vehicle while his passenger, who was intoxicated, went 
into the convenience store and used the restroom. Mr. Tetmyer then went into the convenience 
store, used the restroom, picked out merchandise and paid his bill. That his passenger only went 
to the restroom and Mr. Tetmyer used the facility prior to paying is a meaningless factor. To say 
that it is common sense to infer that they were drinking in the vehicle and had to use the bathroom 
lln Smith, supra, the Court did not elaborate on this "common sense conclusion about 
human behavior", other than reciting the facts that supported a finding of reasonable suspicion. 
There, a man had called the poaching hotline and reported that after hearing shots fired, he 
suspected that someone was deer hunting on Buckskin mountain. The caller identified himself 
and gave a description of the vehicle as well as the license number. The officer was aware that it 
was not hunting season and there were no permits within a forty mile radius of that mountain. 
The caller and a companion met with the officer and gave him additional information: they 
had been on the mountain, heard shooting and saw a vehicle parked in the area. They returned to 
the same area the following day, saw the same truck parked in the same area. In addition, they 
saw two men, one with a spotting scope and one with a scope mounted on a rifle. 
While talking to the officer, a truck approached. One of the men identified it by sound as 
the same one that they had been discussing. 
Certainly, the facts in this case support a common sense conclusion that the men had been 
engaged in unlawful hunting. 
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as a result of this drinking is patently absurd.2 
There were no additional factors supporting the hunch that there was drinking in the 
vehicle. Neither officer knew where the vehicle had been traveling from; Their only observation 
was that the vehicle pulled up to the gas pumps. The officers did not observe any containers nor 
did they smell the odor of alcohol on either occupant. There is simply no evidence that either 
occupant was drinking in the vehicle. That Mr. Tetmyer's passenger was intoxicated adds little to 
this analysis; It is disingenuous to suggest that the passenger got intoxicated in the vehicle when 
there is no evidence to suggest this. 
The State's reliance on State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) is inapposite. 
There, objective, articulable factors were present which supported reasonable suspicion of an 
open container violation. There, the officer observed a can of beer on the vehicle, the passengers' 
door was open and one of the occupants was urinating by the vehicle. Id. at 12. Clearly, there 
was reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was drinking in the car. This is a far cry 
from the instant case where Mr. Tetmyer and his passenger used the facilities at a convenience 
store, where Mr. Tetmyer purchased some goods and gassed up his vehicle. See also Utah v. 
Rochell, 850 P.2d 480 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(Probable cause to search the vehicle where 
Defendant was lawfully stopped for speeding and when he went to get documentation, he opened 
the door and a cup of alcohol fell to the ground. Both occupants smelled of alcohol and 
2Common sense and simple biology support a conclusion that drinking excessive amounts 
of liquid or a diuretic, such as any caffeinated beverage, would result in having to urinate after a 
one hour drive. The Trial Court took judicial notice that it was exactly fifty miles from restroom 
to restroom (R. 26). 
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Defendant admitted to drinking.) 
With respect to Mr. Tetmyer's gait, the evidence is hardly articulable. Appellee asserts 
that according to Officer Eberling: 
[Mr. Tetmyer was] using the car as a balance point 
with his hand. And when he'd move away from it, 
you could see he was a little unsteady, and he'd put 
his hand back down on the car. 
(Appellee's Brief at p. 4). This is wholly inaccurate and false. That testimony was about the 
passenger, not Mr. Tetmyer: The record reflects the following as Eberling was testifying. 
Q. [by Mr. Halls] "What did you observe?" 
A. "He used—the passenger at the time was 
using the car as a balance point with his hand. And 
when he'd move away from it. you could see that he 
was a little unsteady, and he'd put his hand back 
down on the car. Then when he entered the store, 
he was ~ he was unsure of his footing. You could 
see that he was very deliberate with his walking, 
looking at the ground, making sure he watched his 
step." 
Q. "Okay. And then do you remember 
observing Mr. Tetmyer?" 
(R. 18, emphasis added). 
Appellee places heavy emphasis on the colloquy between the Trial Court and Trooper 
Eldredge (Appellee's Brief at p. 15). Appellee, however, ignores the reasoning and ultimate 
ruling with respect to Trooper Eldredge's testimony. 
For instance, although the Trial Court watched Trooper Eldredge "mimic" Mr. Tetmyer's 
gait and said, at one point, "you kind of stumbled", no credit was given to Trooper Eldredge's 
claim that Mr. Tetmyer "stumbled, caught himself and almost fell down like the [passenger]." 
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(R. 16 ). The Court only focused on the claim that Mr. Tetmyer was not "walking straight," 
stressing that the problem with Mr. Tetmyer's gait was subtle: 
I think the officer has been fair in describing that this 
was not obvious. It's something that he may not 
have really paid attention to were it not for the 
obviously intoxicated condition of the passenger. 
But, I think there's an indicator there, and I -I 
believe the officer when he says that he was not 
walking in a straight line. 
(R. 33-34, emphasis added). 
The Court also relied on Officer Eberling's testimony that Mr. Tetmyer was using the 
vehicle as a balance point, in determining that Trooper Eldredge was accurate about the gait. 
Officer Eberling's testimony was less clear. With respect to Mr. Tetmyer, Officer Eberling 
testified as follows: 
[Mr. Tetmyer] was out by his car. When he was out 
by his car, granted it was quite a distance, but he 
appeared to be doing — he was on the opposite side 
to the car, on the east side of the car and we're on 
the west inside the store. It appeared that he was 
using the car, also, as a balance point making sure he 
kept one hand propped on it. 
(R. 18-19). 
The Court considered Officer Eberling's testimony: 
. . .simply as an indicator that Trooper Eldredge is 
probably telling the truth about that. Not that it's an 
independent item of information communicated and 
considered by Trooper Eldredge, but that it indicates 
that it was probably a correct observation. 
(R. 34). 
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Eberling's testimony did not lend support to the conclusion that Mr. Tetmyer was 
impaired. His observation is dramatically different from his observations concerning the way that 
the passenger was handling himself He simply concluded that Mr. Tetmyer was impaired based 
Mr. Tetmyer's hand being on the vehicle while he pumped gas. Equally disturbing is the Trial 
Court's statement that this testimony meant that Trooper Eldredge was "probably telling the 
truth." 
Appellee's emphasis on Mr. Tetmyer's "very dark" sunglasses when he entered a "dark 
store" is inane (Appellee's Brief at 4). This stop took place at two o'clock in the afternoon (R. 
13). That he failed to take off his glasses is a distinction without a difference. Even the Trial 
Court recognized that3: 
Well, I don't want officers stopping people who 
walk into Trailside or any other convenience store 
wearing sunglasses and not taking them on [sic] 
when they walk into the store. Because I wear 
sunglasses when I drive. They're prescription 
sunglasses, and I don't change them to these glasses 
I'm wearing today just 'cause I walk inside the — a 
convenience store. 
(R. 33). 
Finally, both the Trial Court and Appellee attempt to justify the stop on the grounds that 
there was reasonable suspicion to believe that there was an open container in the vehicle. The 
Trial Court stated: 
3The Trial Court did state that this was a factor or an indicator that can be added when 
someone is not walking straight. (R. 33). 
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Now in the event that this is—this is examined by a 
higher court, I'm going to address the question of 
the open container argument. I didn't hear anything 
from Trooper Eldredge that he went through an 
analysis where he thought, "Gee, there's probably 
open container here." However, if he had 
considered that question, I think he would have been 
entitled to, probably on firmer ground, to stop the 
vehicle to determine if there were open containers. 
(R. 34-35, See also Appellee's Brief at p. 8-9). 
This argument should fail for two reasons. First, the open container argument is little 
more than hindsight reconstruction: 
Determining the constitutionality of intrusions by the 
prosecution's ability to justify them under some set 
of objective circumstances would undermine the 
Court's concern with limiting unreviewable 
discretion in the name of the objective test designed 
to safeguard that concern. 
United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1988). 
Here, it is undisputed that Eldredge did not initiate the stop because he believed there was 
an open container in the vehicle. It is not fair to allow the Trial Court or Appellee to now claim 
that the stop was justified on an entirely different basis. 
Secondly, the factors set forth to justify a stop of open containers are insufficient. Again, 
the factors set forth in both Davis and Rochelle stands in sharp contrast to the instant case. 
Finally, both the Trial Court and the Appellee make cursory reference to the designated 
driver policy. Appellee contends that there would be no "chilling effect" on the policy if law 
enforcement and the courts take into account the driver's "apparent sobriety and other relevant 
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circumstances." (Appellee's Brief at p. 10-11, fn. 2). The Trial Court, on the other hand, directly 
contradicts itself. First, it makes a general statement of concern about the designated driver 
policy. : "I don't want Troopers stopping everybody who has somebody drunk as a passenger in 
their car. Otherwise, what's the point of having a designated driver?" (R. 34). Then the Trial 
Court later states that having an intoxicated passenger rises to the level of probable cause to 
search the car for open containers: "[W]here you have a passenger —where you stop a vehicle 
and you have an intoxicated individual in the car, you can look for open containers." (R. 35). 
The Court's reasoning does violence to the designated driver policy and essentially undermines it. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the trial court's ruling on 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress be reversed. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of July, 1997. 
/Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief 
were mailed, postage prepaid, to Joanne Slotnick, Assistant Attorney General, P.O. Box 140854, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854, on this i^_ day of July, 1997. 
The undersigned further certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief 
was hand-delivered to the Office of the San Juan County Attorney, 297 South Main, Monticello, 
UT on this ^—day of July, 1997. 
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